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Legal opinions are many things to many people. In academia they
are used as data points to support certain theories about the law and to
reject others. And so it is with the most anticipated decision in corporate
governance in a decade: the August 9, 2005 ruling of Delaware's
Chancellor Chandler in In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation.'
My idea is that this case tells us a great deal more about the
jurisdictional competition for corporate charters and about the nature of
the judicial process in Delaware than it tells us about corporate
governance. In fact, my idea is that the opinion is purposefully vague
about the contours of corporate law and corporate governance, which, I
will argue, may have been the point of the exercise.
I. WHAT WE KNOW
Several important things are immediately clear, even before we
begin reading the opinion. We know, for example, that the case dragged
on for years before a decision was reached, which is not always the case
in Delaware. And we know that after an excruciatingly long trial (thirty-
seven days over a three-month period), in which masses of lawyers and
twenty-four different witnesses generated 9,360 pages of trial transcript,
the defendants won a complete victory. We also know (from the table of
contents) that the majority of the lengthy opinion (174 pages) is devoted
to a recitation of the facts, which is odd, since the facts were notoriously
well-known by everybody remotely interested in the case, or vaguely
familiar with the practice of corporate law.
We learn more, but not much more, from reading the opinion. We
learn that the opinion adds startlingly little to our previous stock of
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knowledge about corporate law. We also learn that the opinion,
seemingly intentionally, provides almost no guidance for future litigants.
The deep meaning of the Disney derivative litigation can be easily
summarized: Delaware is a good place to be incorporated from the
perspective of companies and their shareholders; it's even better from
the perspective of the lawyers who sue Delaware companies and who
represent them in such suits. The Delaware judiciary has created an
environment in which lawsuits are plentiful, legal fees are high, and
attorneys' fees generously awarded, but where directors, in the end, are
protected from liability by the slow and steady hand of the Delaware
judiciary.
The outcome in the case was fairly predictable. In fact, my
colleague Henry Hansmann predicted it. Illinois College of Law
professor Larry Ribstein even wrote an ersatz opinion shortly before the
real opinion was released opining on the issue of whether the evidence at
trial supports the complaint's allegations and meets the standards for
liability under the business judgment rule and section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware Code that closely tracks the one ultimately issued by
Chancellor Chandler. Ribstein wrote that "[a]fler a thorough trial in
which the facts were ably and fully presented on both sides, I conclude
that this record does not support relief."
2
In other words, the evidence supports Roberta Romano's well-
known argument that one of the major selling points that Delaware has
to offer companies is the predictability of its law.3 Specifically, Romano
has shown that "Delaware is so successful in the corporate charter
business" because it (like many other states) offers an attractive and
flexible mix of corporate law rules, and then most importantly, it
provides a credible commitment that it will continue to supply this
desirable mix of rules in the future.4
II. COMPETING THEORIES
Thus, consistent with Romano's theory, it appears that people knew
with a fair degree of precision what the outcome of the Disney litigation
would be. In light of this fact, one must wonder why it took so much
time and so much money to generate the result that everybody was
2. Larry E. Ribstein, A Disney Preview, at http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/
2005/07/a disney_previe.html (July 10, 2005).
3. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle]; see
also ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
4. Romano, Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, supra note 3, at 243-59.
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expecting all along. If the various theories of jurisdictional competition
for corporate charters do not have anything to say about this, then they
are seriously incomplete.
A. The Race-to-the-Top
The Race-to-the-Top theory was the premier entry of the law and
economics movement into the debate about corporate federalism.
Important facets of this theory are reflected in the work of scholars like
Dan Fischel,5 Roberta Romano,6 and Ralph Winter.7 This theory posits
that decisions about where to incorporate will tend to be made in the best
interests of shareholders because an array of market forces (for example,
capital market competition, competition in the managerial labor market,
product market competition) compels managers and directors to
incorporate in the state that best serves the shareholders' interest in
wealth maximization. The corporate federalists conclude that Delaware
retains its position at the forefront of the competition among the states
for corporate charters because it provides the legal environment that is
most conducive to maximizing shareholder wealth.
The recent opinion in the Disney derivative litigation is not
consistent with the Race-to-the-Top hypothesis. The decision draws a
sharp distinction between the activist role of courts in policing against
obvious conflicts and the passive role of the courts in dealing with basic
mismanagement. 8 Indeed, the court is frankly pessimistic about the
capacity of courts to deal with garden variety corporate governance
problems at all. The court opines that even patterns of conduct that "fall
far short of what shareholders expect and demand from those entrusted
with a fiduciary position" and behavior that "does not comport with how
fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act" cannot be
sanctioned because it was "not in violation of law." 9 Thus, the opinion in
Disney is deeply inconsistent with the Race-to-the-Top theory, because it
rejects the fundamental assumption imbedded in it that the states have
5. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom " Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1982).
6. See, e.g., Romano, Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., RALPH K. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 28-42 (1978);
Corporate Governance Proposals Debated by Lawyers, Economists, 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
1823 (Sept. 30, 1983) (remarks of Judge Ralph K. Winter); Ralph K. Winter, State Law,
Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 289-92 (1977).
8. In re Walt Disney Co., No. 15452, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *5-9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9,
2005).
9. id at *199-200.
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value to add to shareholders beyond merely keeping managers' hands
out of the corporate coffers.
B. The Race-to-the-Bottom
Where the Race-to-the-Top theory posits that Delaware law seeks
to advance shareholders' interests, the Race-to-the-Bottom theory
laments the fact that the "pygmy" state of Delaware "prescribes,
interprets, and indeed denigrates national corporate policy as an
incentive to encourage incorporation within its borders .... 0
Proponents of the Race-to-the-Bottom theory assert that markets do not
work very well, that shareholders stupidly persist in investing in
companies only to be systematically ripped off by rapacious managers
who run public companies to benefit themselves; shareholders' interests
be damned. The Race-to-the-Bottom theory therefore posits that the way
to win (indeed, the way that Delaware has won) the jurisdictional
competition for corporate charters is by pandering to managers, that is,
by creating a regulatory environment in which managers can divert
corporate resources to themselves without fear of legal sanction.
Just as the recent opinion in Disney is not consistent with the Race-
to-the-Top hypothesis, it also is flatly inconsistent with the Race-to-the-
Bottom thesis. Directors do not like to be sued. And they do not like to
be made the object of public scorn and ridicule. The fact that this high
profile litigation survived a motion to dismiss on the basis that there was
a possibility that the Disney board had failed to adhere to its fiduciary
duty of "good faith" is not consistent with a theory that asserts that the
Delaware judiciary panders to management." After all, it would be easy
for another state to bar this sort of lawsuit altogether, saving managers
and directors the professional embarrassment of a lengthy trial in which
the judge found that Michael Eisner's (Disney's) "lapses were many,"'
2
and in which he hopes "that this case will serve to inform stockholders,
directors and officers of how the Company's fiduciaries
underperformed.'
13
10. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 701 (1974).
11. See In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also Mark Saltzburg,
Disney Board Acted Properly on $140 Million Ovitz Payout, Delaware Judge Rules, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE HIGHLIGHTS No. 16-33, Aug. 12, 2005 (describing Chancellor Chandler's 2003
opinion in Disney on the defendants' motion to dismiss).
12. 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *198.
13. Id. at *227.
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C. Vertical Federalism
Mark Roe has made a relatively new entry into the debate about
jurisdictional competition for corporate charters, arguing that the
competition for the corporate chartering business is vertical (between
Delaware and the federal government) rather than horizontal. 14 This
theory is wholly unconvincing. The United States Constitution permits
federal law to preempt state law. Thus, if there was a jurisdictional
competition between the federal government and the states, of the sort
that exists among the states, the federal government would already have
won it. In other words, as I have previously observed, while the states
are, obviously, aware of the existence of the government and its power to
preempt the states, the states interact with the federal government by
exerting political pressure on the federal government to permit the states
to continue to charter and to regulate corporations.15
Theories about jurisdictional competition for corporate charters
posit that states compete for the revenues associated with such
chartering. Roe ignores the fact that corporations must charter in some
state. This chartering generates the tax revenue and other benefits that
the states desire. Corporations (with a few notable exceptions, like
banks) cannot charter at the federal level. So Roe's argument is a non-
starter. Delaware, therefore, does not feel any pressure from the federal
government because corporations could not charter federally even if they
wanted to.
Roe even acknowledges that, while long ago there was some idle
chatter about federal chartering of firms in interstate commerce, this idea
is "not realistic today."' 6 Roe is at least right about this: the federal
government is not threatening to enter the jurisdictional competition for
corporate charters. Oddly, Roe seems oblivious to the fact that this
observation is in fact a concession that wholly undermines his assertion
that Delaware feels competitive pressure from Washington.
17
14. See Mark Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
15. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory
of Regulation, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990). Even on Roe's own terms, his argument fails. Looking at
those episodes in history where the federal government has encroached on the states' regulation of
corporate governance, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Williams Act, the federal proxy rules,
and Sarbanes-Oxley, there is no evidence that the states in general or Delaware in particular did
anything to try to block this legislation.
16. Roe, supra note 14, at 597.
17. Roe at one point attempts to bolster his argument by claiming that Delaware feels pressure
from Washington not because of threatened competition, but because their feelings are hurt by the
criticism that they have endured! Roe writes amusingly that "[t]hough the last serious effort at
federal incorporation disappeared some thirty years ago, Delaware players still chafe from the
2005]
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Any remaining doubt that Delaware feels pressure from
Washington was dispelled recently by Delaware's Chancellor Strine who
observed that the federal government's recent legislative initiative reeks
of "the sour scent of hypocrisy" that "wafted from some important
congressional chambers" in the brewing of the "strange stew" riddled
with "narrow provisions of dubious value."
' 18
Roe's argument might have a little punch if there were any realistic
chance that federal legislation might lower the opportunity costs to
corporations of not incorporating in Delaware. But there is not. As
Romano observed, firms charter in Delaware to minimize litigation risk.
Federal incursions into corporate governance such as Sarbanes-Oxley or
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act do not affect this calculation. We are
left with the banal point that the federal government long has had the
power under the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clauses of the
United States. Constitution to preempt Delaware law. However, we have
no indication why this power will manifest itself in a competition over
the content of substantive law rather than in a demand by politicians in
Washington for political support in exchange for forbearance from
regulation.' 9
Il. THE MACEY-MILLER PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
Among the competing theories about the nature of the jurisdictional
competition for corporate charters, it appears clear that the theory that
Geoffrey Miller and I articulated in 1987 continues to provide the most
robust and complete explanation for the outcome in the Disney
litigation. 20 Our hypothesis, which is based on the interest-group theory
of legislation,21 and draws heavily on Roberta Romano's work,22 posits
that the stable, predictable, and sophisticated body of corporate law in
Delaware comes with a heavy price, extracted by powerful interest
criticism they then endured" decades ago (unsurprisingly, Roe's assertion here is not supported by
citation). Id.
18. Stephen Taub, Influential Delaware Judge Slams Sarbox, CFO.COM, July 6, 2005, at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/4149256.
19. See generally Macey, supra note 15.
20. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987).
21. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227-30 (1986); Sam Peltzman,
Towards a More General Theory of Economic Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCr. 3 (1971).
22. See sources cited supra note 3.
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groups within the state, particularly lawyers, who enjoy the dominant
position within the culture that generates corporate law rules.
23
Our theory well explains the juxtaposition between the early
decision on the motion to dismiss, which held so much promise for the
plaintiffs, and the resounding defeat for the same group two years and
millions of dollars in attorneys' fees later.
Our theory also explains other peculiarities about the decision,
although the odd juxtaposition between the opinion in the Motion to
Dismiss and the opinion after trial is quite supportive of our hypothesis.
For one thing, the opinion is noteworthy for its encouraging tone
towards future lawsuits. As one commentator presciently observed,
despite finding for the defendants, in writing its decision "the court has
put a 'please file claims' sign on their door,' 24 and even hinted that
future suits might be treated differently.25
Moreover, there is the tone of the opinion, in which the directors are
repeatedly chastised for failing to live up to best practices as they apply
to corporate governance issues. It will be worth a lot of professional fees
to directors to avoid being pilloried the way that the directors and top
officers of Disney were pilloried in this opinion. In other words, from the
perspective of our theory, this opinion is noteworthy because it manages
to side with the defendants while simultaneously giving them significant
incentives to cloak their decisions in a dense shroud of process and to
take other steps that will generate high fees for lawyers, investment
bankers, and other advisors (who, incidentally, are precisely the same
people who advise companies to incorporate in Delaware in the first
place).
So, the opinion in Disney tends to support the Macey-Miller
interest-group theory of Delaware corporate law. That theory predicts
that Delaware law will be generally pro-defendant in order to attract
chartering, but will do so in such a way that demand for the services of
lawyers and other professional advisors remains strong. Along these
lines, we observe that the litigation in this case is not over. The plaintiffs
have vowed to appeal. Fees will be generated. We predict a settlement
that will bring nothing of any value to Disney shareholders, but may well
result in a generous fee award for the intrepid plaintiffs' attorneys who
brought this case.
23. Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 473.
24. Thaddeus C. Kopinski, Ovitz Ruling Highlights Executive Pay Debate, ISS GOVERNANCE
WEEKLY, available at http://www.issproxy.com/governance/publications/2005archived/150.jsp (last
visited Sept. 1, 2005).
25. Id.
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Consistent with our theory, the plaintiffs' attorneys who brought
this case are already setting the stage for their fee petition, which will
revolve around the issue of whether there was a substantial benefit
conferred on the corporation as a result of this litigation. This is what the
lawyers for the plaintiffs may be referring to when they assert in the face
of this resounding defeat that:
[t]his lawsuit has already positively impacted how corporate America
manages its affairs, making clear that company resources cannot be
used to line the pockets of senior executives. In addition, the Disney
case has impelled America's boardrooms into closer scrutiny of chief
executive officers' usurpation of managerial and supervisory duties-
duties that boards have an obligation to companies and shareholders to
oversee ....
Because of our strong belief in the enforcement of fiduciary
responsibilities on the part of officers and directors under Delaware
law-and our conviction that these responsibilities were not met in this
case, we are committed to appeal the decision by Chancellor
Chandler ....
It would be unfortunate for shareholders and employees of public
companies if this decision is read by corporate managers as a license to
act in disregard of their duties to engage in the deliberate processes
required by fiduciaries.
26
Race-to-the-Bottom, Race-to-the-Top, vertical competition,
interest-group theory: these are the alternative theories that exist to
explain United States corporate law in general, and Delaware's
dominance in particular. The theory I developed twenty years ago with
Geoffrey Miller continues to provide the most convincing account of
Delaware's appeal to those who advise corporations about where to file
their charters. Delaware is a great place for shareholders and managers to
locate a corporation. The state has what has been identified as important
"first-mover" advantages over other states that, in turn, give the state a
significant degree of market power in the jurisdictional competition for
26. See PRNewswire, Plaintiffs Led by Milberg Weiss Will Appeal Decision on Michael
Ovitz' Severance Payout From Disney, at http://www.kvoa.com/Global/story.asp?S=3702366 (last
visited Aug. 18, 2005) (quoting plaintiff attorneys Seth Rigrodsky, Joshua Vinik, and Melvyn
Weiss, respectively).
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corporate charters.27 The lion's share of the economic rents that this
market power make possible are collected by the lawyers who advise
Delaware companies.
27. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1923 (1998).
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